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Abstract 
Global warming caused by accumulation of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) is a 
public bad, addressing which requires collective action by all the countries of the 
world.  Under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), most 
countries have negotiated the Kyoto Protocol for GHG emissions control to stabilize 
climate change. Several issues about the Protocol remain unresolved -- first, most of the 
significant countries are required to take a decision on whether or not to sign such a 
protocol, which has large-scale implications for their energy and industrial sectors and 
economic well-being; second, climate change mitigation is a public good entailing that 
all the countries would stand to gain due to mitigation action taken by a sub-group of 
one or more countries; and third, there exists no supra-national authority to enforce 
such a protocol for the individual sovereign nations. Thus, commitment to cooperate on 
an international agreement on climate change control remains tenuous. Formally, such 
a cooperative model is likely to be unstable. The paper discusses the pros and cons of 
the already proposed international cooperative mechanisms toward climate change 
mitigation and highlights the problem of information revelation, particularly related to 
the abatement issues. In this context, it attempts to outline a structure of a self-
enforcing burden sharing mechanism for climate change mitigation in an incomplete 
information framework. The mechanism is an adoption of the well-known Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism, widely used in mechanism design theory. 
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1. Introduction 
The Earth is warming up, and there is now adequate scientific consensus that climate 
change is happening, and that it is due to anthropogenic activities. A majority of the 
observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is most 
likely due to the observed increase in human-induced concentrations of pollutants, such 
as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), called the GHGs. 
The global increases in CO2 concentration are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land-
use change (deforestation, agricultural land conversion), while those of CH4 and N2O 
are primarily find their origin in agriculture (water logging in paddy fields, ruminating 
bovine etc.) or other industrial activities. 
With global warming on the increase, the likelihood that the ecosystem will either adapt 
or reverse naturally is diminishing. The impact of global warming is and will take the 
form of changes in hydrological cycles and associated agricultural productivity, 
extreme weather variations, thermal expansion causing rising sea levels, increase in 
pests and diseases and species extinction. The impact is likely to be more severe for 
developing countries. The reasons vary from lack of resources, coping capacities and 
abject poverty to geographical disadvantage due to location in tropical regions where 
severe weather will hit the most, and concerns regarding a rise in the sea level in the 
case of the small island nations. 
Most of the countries of the world believe that something needs to be done to tackle 
global warming and climate change. Since global warming is a global public bad, 
tackling it requires collective action on the part of all countries. In this context, 
countries have negotiated a worldwide agreement on GHG emissions control in order to 
stabilise climate change called the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 
Kyoto, Japan, on December 11, 1997, and it entered into force on February 16, 2005. A 
hundred and ninety three parties (192 states and 1 regional economic integration 
organisation) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) have ratified the protocol to date. 
Several issues about the Kyoto Protocol remain unresolved. For instance, most of the 
significant countries of the world are involved and required to take a decision on 
whether or not to sign the protocol, which has large-scale implications for their energy 
and industrial sectors as well as their economic policies in general. Moreover, climate 
change mitigation is a public good that all countries would stand to gain from. Since 
such mitigation could result from actions taken by a subgroup of one or more countries, 
there is a strong incentive for the rest of the world to free ride on countries that take 
mitigating action. In addition, there exists no supra-national authority to enforce such a 
protocol for individual sovereign nations. Thus, in the absence of positive net economic 
benefits to individual countries, no commitment to co-operate with other countries on 
an international agreement on climate change control is expected to be implementable. 
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Consequently, the enforcement of the protocol has run into rough weather. Many of the 
Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, mainly developed countries who have increased 
their emissions instead of reducing them as agreed (UNFCCC website), lack 
credibility.4 On the other hand, despite the clamour by developed countries that large 
emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India, must accept binding emission 
reduction commitments, the latter have taken recourse to developmental arguments or 
the need to grow and reduce poverty for not accepting these binding commitments. 
They are willing to take a developmental path that minimises emissions, but given their 
income levels, the transfer of expensive green technology to them must be facilitated by 
developed countries, a suggestion generally opposed by the developed countries. Each 
side believes that it has to bear the costs while the benefits would go to the other and is, 
therefore, unwilling to take or commit to any mitigation action. In order to break this 
impasse, it is imperative to focus attention on the incentives that individual countries 
may have to sign an international agreement on climate change control. 
Given the context, the principal aim of this research is to evolve a new framework of 
self-enforcing climate change mitigation actions and ensuring burden sharing with 
thrust on the implementation procedure. The self-enforcement mechanism will be 
established internationally and ensure compliance, driven by the compatibility of the 
incentive mechanism with individual countries’ self-interested goals. 
The monograph is organised as follows. Section 2 identifies the major issues in, as well 
as the current status of, international climate change negotiations. Section 3 provides an 
international perspective on climate change in terms of policies and actions to mitigate 
GHGs in the European Union (EU), United States (US), emerging economies and 
elsewhere, including their experience with the cap and trade systems, carbon taxation, 
and such like. Section 4 discusses the pros and cons of the proposed international co-
operative mechanisms toward climate change mitigation and highlights the problem of 
information revelation, particularly related to abatement issues. In the concluding 
section 5, an attempt is made to outline the structure of a new self-enforcing climate 
change treaty in an incomplete information framework. It also identifies the scope for 
future work.  
2. Major issues in and current status of climate change negotiations 
2.1. Current state of play at the international negotiations on climate change 
Over the years, nations realised the need to take action to reduce emissions of GHGs, 
which, apart from natural forces, are a major factor responsible for global warming. 
The scientific community claims that with the stabilisation of GHG concentration to 
450-550 parts per million (ppm) by 2050, the temperature increase could be contained 
                                                 
4 UNFCCC Website. 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/ghg_table
_06.pdf  
4 
to less than 2°C. The first ever step taken to address this issue was on May 9, 1992, 
when the UNFCCC was constituted. A further step was taken in this regard on 
December 11, 1997, when the governments adopted the landmark Kyoto Protocol, 
which entered into force on February 16, 2005. The protocol imposed varied legally 
binding emissions reduction targets for industrialised nations and the economies in 
transition (termed as Annex-I countries), with an average reduction target of 5.2 per 
cent below the 1990 levels, to be achieved during the period 2008-2012. Countries 
decided on the individual target shares through a process of negotiations. The nations 
had to initiate domestic policies and measures that would help cut back their GHG 
emissions. Besides, the protocol allowed nations to establish innovative mechanisms 
(such as Joint Implementation (JI), participating in joint projects with developing 
nations through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and establishing an 
Emissions Trading (ET) regime (among Annex-I parties)) to enable them to meet their 
emissions reduction goals through cost-effective approaches. A review of the progress 
on emissions reduction points out that, during 1990-2006, the emissions in the Annex I 
countries reduced by around 4.7 per cent. Interestingly, however, the reduction was due 
to slackening of economic activity in the countries of the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe (the so called “economies in transition”), as the emissions in the 
remaining Annex I countries rose by around 10 per cent over the same period.   
Since the term of the protocol expires in 2012, a new global climate deal is essential to 
continue efforts beyond 2012. Developing countries are to play a decisive role in 
negotiating a post-Kyoto climate agreement. The negotiating governments had 
envisaged signing a new agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol during the 13th 
Conference of Parties (CoP) at Bali, Indonesia in 2007 and the 15th CoP at 
Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009  a goal that remains largely unfulfilled. 
At the Bali UN Summit, the parties to the UNFCCC adopted several agreements 
pertaining to the post-Kyoto treaty. The thrust was on improving the dissemination of 
renewable energy technologies, lower emissions and plan lower energy consumption 
targets. Furthermore, the meeting also led to the creation of an Ad hoc Working Group 
on Long-Term Co-operative Action (AWGLCA) that aimed to enforce the Convention  
in participating countries up to and beyond 2012. The AWGLCA has been reporting to 
subsequent CoPs. 
The Copenhagen Summit of 2009 did not achieve a binding agreement for long-term 
action. What emerged from it was a political accord negotiated by around 28 parties, 
championed by US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. The Copenhagen accord was 
'noted' by the CoP merely as an external document, which was not negotiated within the 
UNFCCC process. The document referred to the collective commitment by developed 
countries for new and additional resources of around US$30 billion for period 2010-12 
through international institutions - a promise that has yet to be met.   
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A key deviation in the approach of the international climate change negotiations that 
was ushered in by the Copenhagen Summit was a move from a centralised (or top-
down) to a more decentralised approach for mitigation action. The Copenhagen Accord 
emerging out of the deliberations of the summit did not address the issue of assigning 
specific targets for emissions cuts or a decisive peak year of global emissions. Instead, 
more than 100 countries committed themselves voluntarily to seek emissions cuts to 
hold the average increase in global temperatures to below 2°C. The goal itself has been 
considered somewhat ambitious and there is some scepticism about the ability of 
countries to realise it (Stern, 2009). Furthermore, the reliance on carbon markets did not 
find any explicit mention in the Accord.  It merely stated the intention to use 
opportunities for relying on market mechanisms (UNFCCC, 2010). By May 2010, 127 
countries had indicated their support for the Copenhagen Accord.  Further, 42 Annex I 
countries and 42 non-Annex I countries have provided information on their intention to 
adopt measures towards reducing emissions/emissions intensity and other mitigation 
actions, as agreed under the accord. India, China and other emerging economies (along 
with developed country partners) have undertaken voluntary pledges to reduce carbon 
emissions intensity levels by varying degrees. India has pledged to reduce its emissions 
intensity by 20-25 per cent of the 2005 level by 2020. Chinese has a more ambitious 
goal to reduce the emissions intensity by 40-45 per cent of the 2005 level, again by 
2020. The Brazilian pledge is to reduce emissions between 36-39 per cent of the 2020 
business-as-usual level. The US has taken the national position to cut emissions by 17 
per cent of the 2005 level, the EU by 20-25 per cent (or even higher) of 1990 level, 
Russia and Japan by 25 per cent of the 1990 level. 
Though the Copenhagen Accord failed to set a new deadline for a legally binding treaty 
to succeed the Kyoto Protocol, it brought to the fore several important issues. It 
recognised that global temperature increases should be limited to 2°C above the pre-
industrial levels. This would require that emissions be reduced to half their 1990 levels 
by 2050. Since developing nations need to grow, a significant share of the emissions 
cut would have to come from developed nations.  
There were other significant outcomes of the Copenhagen Summit that have a bearing 
on future negotiations. The summit demonstrated that there is not a single country or a 
coalition of countries that would take a lead in initiating climate change policies or 
have unchallenged influence on the climate change scene.  Major GHG emitting 
nations would always have an incentive to form a bloc and hinder any progress on 
international climate negotiations and this forms a big obstacle in the development of 
new mitigation strategies. It also made it evident that existing nations would have to be 
convinced that any action on their part for mitigating climate change impact would not 
hinder their economic prosperity, and, hence, reliance would have to be placed on 
nationally appropriate mitigation action (NAMA). This was coupled with the need for 
technology transfer and financing mechanisms, which could be propagated to the 
nations of the world.  
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Next, the AWGLCA was due to report to CoP 16 at Cancun, Mexico during November 
29-December 10, 2010. The Cancun meeting can be considered a step forward in the 
following respects. First, the Cancun Agreements lay down nationally appropriate 
mitigation targets and actions (as in the Copenhagen Accord) for around 80 countries – 
including significant GHG emitters such as China, the US, the EU, Brazil and India, by 
the year 2020.  In this respect, the meeting also came up with agreements on the 
mechanisms for monitoring and verification that were laid out in the Copenhagen 
Accord and that now encompass international consultation and analyses of developing 
country mitigation actions. Second, the agreements also progressed on plans for 
tropical forest protection (the so-called Reduced Deforestation and Forest Degradation, 
or REDD+), by establishing a scheme under which wealthy countries could help 
prevent deforestation in poor countries by possibly working through market 
mechanisms. Next, there was the official UN Agreement to hold the temperature rise 
below a global average of 2°C. And finally, the agreements set up the so-called Green 
Climate Fund to provide financing for mitigation action and technological adaptation, 
with the World Bank as the interim trustee of the Fund. Specifically, it is envisaged that 
developed countries would mobilise $100 billion annually by 2020 to support 
mitigation efforts and technology adaptation in developing countries, which would 
include public and private sources (that is, carbon markets and private finance), 
bilateral and multilateral fund flows, as well as the Green Climate Fund. 
2.2 Key issues for future negotiations 
There is a huge challenge in addressing global climate change by arriving at 
multilateral arrangements among all major economies to moderate and/or reduce GHG 
emissions. Though the Kyoto Protocol imposed binding commitments on Annex I 
countries to reduce their emissions during 2008-2012, one has witnessed a steady 
erosion of the coverage of the emissions. The original Kyoto Protocol covered ~ 66 per 
cent of 1990 industrial CO2 emissions. However, with the US not ratifying the 
agreement and a decline in the relative emissions of rich countries, the Kyoto Protocol 
presently includes countries that comprise only ~ 27% of global emissions. Large 
emerging economies such as China, India or Brazil have not been willing to accept any 
obligatory reduction commitments since this may not be inconsistent with their growth 
and development aspirations. Besides, the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibility” acknowledges that these countries are allowed to have their emissions 
grow to catch up with the economic level of developed countries. On their part, the 
developed countries have been clamouring for an agreement that includes all the major 
emitters, including large emerging economies such as China and India, to undertake 
significant mitigation commitments to make any mitigation effectual at the global level. 
The discussions at the Copenhagen Summit and thereafter, point toward the fact that 
these concerns are likely to persist during the discussions of the post-2012 climate 
effort.  
7 
Achieving international co-operation to address climate change has become an onerous 
task given the strong free-rider incentives. Being a global public good, everyone 
benefits from climate change mitigation, while only those who undertake it have to bear 
the mitigation cost. Co-operation is potentially difficult to implement given the 
sovereignty of participating nations, the absence of a supra-national authority to impose 
emissions targets and significant side-payments obligatory to make such co-operative 
endeavour feasible. Besides, if co-operation is linked to other issues, such as trade 
restrictions or border tax adjustments, it undermines economic efficiency. Interestingly, 
the feasibility of achieving a socially desirable outcome through full cooperation is 
derived from the threat that no coalition will benefit if the grand coalition of countries 
breaks into singletons when any coalition breaks away from it. However, the threat that 
countries will break into singletons if one or more countries leave the grand coalition 
may not be credible (see Wood, 2009 commenting on the results in Chander and 
Tulkens, 1997). What has been witnessed is the formation of parallel climate blocs or 
countries. The experience of the 2009 Copenhagen Summit negotiations is illustrative 
of some of these concerns.  
Therefore, there is the need to seek out mechanisms to engage large developing nations 
in voluntary or self-enforcing mitigation activities in the forthcoming negotiations, 
given their reluctance to accept binding emissions reduction commitments and given 
the constraints on the information environment (regarding individual countries’ costs of 
abatement and preferences for environmental quality) in which the negotiations are 
being held.  
3. An international perspective on climate policies 
As can be understood from the earlier discussions, the presence of an externality in the 
production or consumption activities of both industry and households gives rise to a 
wide-range of environmental problems. The inadequate pricing of environmental goods 
results in the failure of the market system. Existing markets can no longer correct for 
the distortions arising from pollution and the level of pollution is much higher than is 
socially desirable. Two broad types of policy instruments available to correct the 
externality problems are command and control measures (CAC) and market-based 
instruments (MBIs). The CAC measures consist of standards and norms imposed by 
regulatory authorities to improve environmental quality. The MBIs, on the other hand, 
consist of taxes/ subsidies/tradable pollution permits/economic incentives, all of which 
mainly work through getting the relative market prices right. Carbon taxation and 
emissions trading are the two most commonly prescribed MBIs worldwide to 
mitigateGHGs and climate change.  
Market-based climate policy instruments play a crucial role in market economies for 
combating challenges posed by climate change. If an accurate price is put on GHG 
emissions and markets are effective in transferring this price signal to the decision-
making processes of companies and individuals, there will be an efficient allocation of 
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limited resources and emissions targets will be met at the lowest cost. However, 
successful implementation of these instruments will need that the government adopts a 
certain policy mix for its effective functioning. Some of the commonly used MBIs that 
put a price on GHG emissions are levying a unit tax, creating a carbon market or 
providing subsidies. Although, taxation is the most commonly suggested, there remain 
several challenges in making use of environmental taxation. If the marginal abatement 
costs are assumed to be high or involve high uncertainties, setting the right tax level is a 
very complex issue. 
An alternative and effective solution for curtailing GHG emissions is emissions trading. 
This involves a cap-and-trade approach, where the desired level of emissions is first 
defined and then used to establish an overall cap on the emissions from a system. 
Emissions certificates equal to this cap are issued. Participants are required to hold 
certificates to cover their emissions in a given period and are penalised for non-
compliance. So, they face the choice between implementing emissions reduction 
measures and buying emissions certificates in order to comply. The price of the 
certificates in the market is determined by the interaction of demand and supply and it 
represents the implicit price of GHG emissions. The trading of emissions rights 
amongst nations is expected to lead to equalisation of the permit price and the marginal 
abatement cost across countries and hence, result in an economically efficient outcome. 
Emissions trading would also help address international equity concerns in GHG 
mitigation.  
 The following discussion covers the experience with carbon taxation and the cap-and-
trade mechanism as an instrument used for mitigating environmental pollution in select 
OECD countries. This will help in understanding the key characteristics of tradable 
permit schemes used in each of these nations and in providing insights into the lessons 
learned from the world-wide use of cap-and-trade mechanism to enable their use in 
future climate change mitigation. 
3.1.  Carbon taxation and abatement subsidies 
Among the prevalent market-based policy options to reduce GHG emissions, carbon 
taxes and emissions abatement subsidies have gradually emerged as cost-effective and 
efficient instruments over a period. A tax or a subsidy puts a price on the GHG 
emissions by internalising the environmental and social cost of global emissions in the 
price of the product. Hence, it results in an economically efficient means of combating 
global GHG emissions. Taxing the carbon content of the fuel acts as an incentive to 
reduce its consumption and promotes the development of innovative energy-reducing 
technology, which would further result in lower emissions. 
In US, the usage of carbon tax as an effective emissions reduction instrument has 
percolated down to the local level. The city of Boulder in Colorado (in US) 
implemented the tax on carbon emissions from electricity in April 2007. Similarly, 
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Quebec, the second largest province in Canada also levied a carbon tax on petroleum, 
natural gas and coal in October 2007. British Columbia introduced their carbon taxation 
in 2008. Energy taxes in Europe were introduced initially to raise budget revenues and 
control oil imports. However, this changed during the 1980s, when gasoline taxes in 
Europe were used to meet the environmental objectives. Finland was one of the first 
countries to levy a carbon tax in 1990. This was followed by the imposition of the 
carbon tax by Sweden (in 1991), Netherlands (in 1996), Germany (in 1998) and UK (in 
2000) to curb GHG emissions. The European Commission proposed the first EU-wide 
carbon tax in the year 1992 (The Reality of Carbon Taxes in the 21st Century, 2008). 
However, this proposal and many more such attempts made were rejected by the EU 
member states. In 2005, with the adoption of an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 
the EU, there was no more interest among member states to use carbon tax as an 
emission control device.  
With the uncertainties associated with the cost of reducing emissions, a tax could prove 
to be a more efficient incentive-based option in tackling the global climate change 
problem. If the level of the tax could be co-ordinated among the major emitting nations, 
the global emissions reduction target could be achieved at a minimum possible cost. 
Climate change problem arises from the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere over a 
span of time. A steadily rising tax would help accommodate the cost fluctuations 
(arising from the variations in the cost of cutting emissions each year) by providing 
firms higher incentives to cut down larger emissions when the cost is low and cut down 
on emission reduction when it is costly. 
However, one must also make a note of the fact that there are a few shortcomings of 
using carbon tax as an effective method to combat global emissions. It is extremely 
difficult to judge accurately the impact of a carbon tax on GHG emissions or the time 
frame over which its effect would be realised. Its success in reducing emissions 
depends on whether the tax has been able to raise the price of fuel to such an extent that 
it significantly reduces consumer demand for GHG emitting products and how effective 
it has been in developing innovative low-energy using technologies. The rate of 
emission reduction may also be rise to the extent that tax revenues are used to fund 
future research or other programmes that help achieve additional emission reductions.  
3.2. Cap-and-trade mechanisms  
3.2.1. US 
Rising pollution costs in the US raised the demand for cost-effective instruments to 
lower environmental pollution. Among the several proposals for curtailing GHG 
emissions, the national cap-and-trade programme for limiting and reducing carbon 
emissions seems to have emerged more prominently in the US as compared to an 
emissions tax. Similar to a carbon tax, the cap-and-trade scheme has the effect of 
imputing a price on carbon. Tradable permits are considered effective market-based 
policy instruments, which, if designed appropriately and implemented properly, would 
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encourage firms to undertake pollution control efforts in their own interest and help 
meet collective policy goals. The environmental policy makers also prefer tradable 
permits to an emissions tax for a variety of reasons. As opposed to an emissions tax, a 
tradable permit helps regulators conceal the explicit cost of environmental protection 
from the consumers. It helps reduce emissions instead of simply reallocating them 
among different sources. A permit scheme specifies the quantity of pollution reduction 
to be achieved in contrast to the indirect and uncertain effect of pollution taxes.  
Under a cap-and-trade system, the total permissible level of pollution is established and 
allocated among the polluting firms in the form of tradable permits. Those firms, which 
are able to restrict their emissions below the permitted levels, could sell their surplus 
permits to other polluting firms. The most successful environmental protection permit 
programme in the US has been the SO2 allowance trading programme for acid rain 
control introduced under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The programme had 
huge benefits arising from the positive human health impact of decreased local SO2 and 
particulate concentrations.  
3.2.2. The European Union  
The ETS has been used intensively in the EU and its experience provides valuable 
lessons to other countries. It was the world’s first cap-and-trade program for CO2 
emissions. Besides the similarity in terms of establishing an absolute cap on CO2 
emissions, the EU-ETS differs from the US cap-and-trade systems for other emissions 
in terms of the distribution of tradable allowances. The key characteristic of the EU-
ETS system is its decentralised approach (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008) in allocating 
emission allowances (permits) across member states and in creating institutions for 
monitoring and managing emissions allowances. This gives much of the authority for 
decision making to the member states. In this milieu, the member states themselves 
decide on the individual cap levels, allocate their allowances (permits) across sources, 
create institutions to monitor, report and verify their emissions and make choices on 
some structural features such as banking, auctioning etc. Each member state has a fixed 
endowment of carbon emissions (whose sum total equals the Kyoto Protocol target for 
EU), which is allocated between the trading and the non-trading sectors of the member 
states depending on the abatement costs. Thus, the EU-ETS comprises an overall cap 
on total emissions (equal to the EU commitment under the Kyoto Protocol) from all 
sectors of the economy across all the member states. The central EU authority (the 
European Commission) then specifies the “trading “sectors that participate initially in 
EU-ETS. The central authority has the objective of minimising the total abatement 
costs subject to the emissions endowment constraints of the member states.  
Since around half of the EU emissions remain in the non-trading sectors, there have to 
be some controls on the sources in these sectors as well. Each member state has its own 
emission target, which it addresses using the National Allocation Plan (NAP). NAP has 
the two-fold task of allocating the total emissions between trading and non-trading 
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sectors of the economy and specifying how the permits in the trading sector will be 
distributed among the individual sources. Under the EU-ETS, the central authority 
determines the demand for allowances by specifying the participating sectors in the 
economy. Supply is determined jointly by the decisions of the individual member 
states. The EU experience indicates that an ETS could be an effective tool, which could 
be modified over time for combating GHG emissions. 
The EU-ETS is not free from criticism either. One criticism of the EU-ETS system 
focuses on the high profits to the electricity sector that resulted from the free allocation 
of allowances and over-allocation of emission permits.  Nonetheless, this experience 
has guided other national governments (such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan) to 
rely on cap-and-trade mechanisms for reducing GHG emissions. Some of the issues 
that need to be addressed while setting up the trading mechanism in a region are 
specifying an adequate period for regulation prior to the start up, setting up efficient 
financial institution to help firms achieve their emissions reduction goal and a good 
emissions database to set targets.   
4. The pros and cons of non-cooperative and co-operative mechanisms toward 
climate change mitigation by countries 
International co-operation among countries is often deemed necessary to cope with 
global pollution, since outcomes related to laissez-faire equilibria turn out to be socially 
inefficient. This is because, under purely decentralised market-based regimes, each 
country chooses its pollution behaviour, ignoring the cost imposed on other countries as 
a result of its behaviour. That is, global warming and climate change, due to GHG 
emissions, is a classic case of global public bad, such that the adoption of non-co-
operative optimal behaviour by countries derived from non-internalisation of damages 
inflicted by a country’s pollution on other countries leads to excessive pollution 
generation as compared to a socially desirable outcome. This is the implication of the 
classic divergence between social and private optima. 
 
In this section, we first define the social optimum of the global climate game. Next, we 
highlight the inefficiency of the non-co-operative Nash outcome in comparison with the 
social optimum. As an alternative, coalitional or membership games, relying on both 
co-operation and non-co-operation are analysed, along with the difficulties associated 
with such solutions. The focus then shifts to a discussion on the problems of 
information asymmetry that underlines the need for self-enforcing incentivised 
mechanisms for climate change mitigation. 
4.1.  The social optimum 
In case of global pollutants such as GHGs, the disutility or damage from pollution 
suffered by each country is dependent on the sum of pollution generated by all 
countries put together. In a static setting, let the set of countries be denoted by, ܰ ൌ
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1, 2, … , ݊. Further, let ݌௜ be the pollutant emissions of country ݅. One could characterise 
the social optimum as the vector of polluting emissions that yields highest net benefit at 
the global level. The social optimum can be achieved within this framework with the 
strong (or heroic!) assumption of a fully enforceable co-operative mechanism that can 
achieve the social optimum through an appropriate treaty for all countries. The 
equilibrium is the solution to net utility maximisation exercise:      
maxሼ୮భ,୮మ,…୮౤ሽ ∑ u୧௜אே  ൌ ∑ ܾ௜௜אே ሺ݌௜ሻ െ ∑ ݀௜௜אே ൫∑ ݌௝௝אே ൯,    (1) 
where ݑ௜ሺ. ሻ is the net utility derived by country ݅, ܾ௜ሺ. ሻ is the gross benefit or utility 
from a country’s own emissions, and ݀௜ሺ. ሻ denotes own damage resulting from the sum 
of emissions from all ݊ countries. It is assumed that ܾ௜′ ൐ 0, ܾ௜′′ ൑ 0, ݀௜′ ൐ 0, and 
݀௜′′ ൒ 0. That is, while both benefits and damages are increasing in the level of 
pollution, the former is increasing at a non-increasing rate, while the latter rises at a 
non-decreasing rate. These assumptions are standard in marginal cost-benefit analysis. 
Here, emissions are viewed as inputs into production or consumption in the benefit 
function, ܾ௜, which is subject to diminishing returns, while damages are increasing as 
more pollution gets generated due to the limited assimilation capacity of the 
environment. 
Solution to (1) yields the first-order condition as  
ܾ௜′ሺ݌௜ሻ ൌ ∑ ݀௜′௜אே ൫∑ ݌௝௝אே ൯, ׊ ݅ א ܰ.         (2) 
This requires that the marginal benefit of pollution for country ݅ is equated to the global 
marginal costs that are equal across all the countries. Simultaneous solution to an 
equation such as (2) for each country ݅ yields the socially desirable pollution vector, 
which we denote by ݌ௌ ൌ ሺ݌ଵௌ, ݌ଶௌ, … . ݌௡ௌሻ.  As implied by (2), each country chooses its 
pollution so as to equate its marginal benefit from pollution to the aggregate marginal 
cost for all the ݊ countries put together.  
However, socially desirable outcomes such as those characterised by the condition in 
eq. (2) are normative equilibria that are almost non-existent in real economies, thus 
making it near impossible to enforce any form of global co-operation in a basic static 
setting such as the one described here. This is because any strategy to co-operate, 
conditional on co-operation by other countries, is never rewarded. That renders it 
irrational for a country to co-operate. This motivates the analysis of non-co-operative 
outcomes in the international climate change game (Finus, 2003).   
4.2.  Non-co-operative behaviour and climate change 
Climate change can be visualised as a special case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, 
wherein each country strategically decides on how much to pollute, given the pollution 
by other countries. That is, the maximisation behaviour of a single country takes as 
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given the emissions of the remaining countries. The Nash equilibrium that emerges can 
be referred to as the status quo, before an international environmental agreement (IEA) 
is signed (Finus, 2003). 
Again, with ݌௜ representing the emissions of country ݅, the net utility/benefit, ݑ௜, for the 
݅th country is expressed as  
ݑ௜ ൌ ܾ௜ሺ݌௜ሻ െ ݀௜൫∑ ݌௝௝אே ൯,         (3) 
where functions ܾ௜ሺ. ሻ and ݀௜ሺ. ሻ are as defined earlier.  
The Nash non-co-operative equilibrium is worked out by solving 
max௣೔ ݑ௜ሺ݌ଵ,݌ଶ, … ݌௜, … ݌௡ሻ ׊ ݅ א ܰ,       (4) 
that yields the first-order condition to be 
ܾ௜′ሺ݌௜ሻ ൌ ݀௜′൫∑ ݌௝௝אே ൯.         (5) 
This implies that the marginal benefit of pollution is equated to own marginal cost by 
each country ݅. Implicitly solving (5) derives the non-co-operative level of pollution 
generated by the ݅th country as a function of pollution levels of all the remaining 
ሺ݊ െ 1ሻ countries, or ݌௜ ൌ ௜݂ሺ݌ି௜ሻ. This constitutes the best-response function of the ݅th 
country, or its best reply, given the emissions of the remaining countries. We would 
thus have ݊ such functions, one for each country in the set ܰ. Notably, the slope of the 
best response function will be derived as  
݀݌௜
݀݌௝ஷ௜
ൌ
݀௜′′
ܾ௜′′ െ ݀௜′′
൏ 0, 
in view of  ܾ௜′′ ൏ 0,  ݀௜′′ ൐ 0. Thus, as expected, the best response to an increase in the 
emissions by any country ݆ is that country ݅ will be induced to reduce its emissions. The 
simultaneous solution of these best response functions will yield the vector of pollution 
levels ݌ே஼ ൌ ሺ݌ଵே஼, ݌ଶே஼, … . ݌௡ே஼ሻ at the non-co-operative Nash equilibrium, which are 
lower than the ‘no-abatement equilibrium’ that assumes a complete disregard for any 
damage/disutility from pollution, ݌ெ௔௫. That is, the vector  ݌ெ௔௫ results as the 
arg max ݑ௜ ൌ ܾ௜ሺ݌௜ሻ, by all ݅. 
Nevertheless, aggregate emissions (here) are higher than what is socially desirable, 
since no country recognises the damages that its own emissions would inflict on other 
countries. In this sense, Nash non-co-operative outcomes are considered as sub-
optimal. The other assumptions that form the basis for a non-co-operative game are 
complete information about each country’s benefits and costs and the absence of a 
central authority that could allocate and enforce pollution rights on countries. In real 
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economies, both these assumptions do not hold. First, typically countries of the world 
do communicate and take co-operative decisions on enforceable agreements, such as 
the Montreal Protocol (to deal with ozone depleting substances) and the Kyoto Protocol 
(to tackle the problem of global warming and climate change due to GHGs). Second, 
information asymmetry in the form of absence of information by participants to the 
treaty about each other’s benefits and costs of pollution may lead to incentives to 
misreport their preferences and/or abatement costs for pollution cleanup. In respect of 
the first, the analysis in the paper has been extended to consider coalition formation to 
incorporate the role of binding commitments as part of an international climate treaty, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol. This is included in Section 4.3. The second of these 
concerns, namely, those relating to information asymmetry that render such co-
operation difficult, constitute the centrepiece our paper and is discussed in Section 5  of 
the paper. 
4.3.  International coalitional games of climate change  
Analytical models of coalitional games have been utilised in the context of climate 
change under both co-operative and non-co-operative game theoretic framework. 
Typically, a co-operation-based coalitional model is distinguished from the one that is 
based on non-co-operation, first, by its focus on what the group of countries can 
achieve in terms of emissions abatement as part of a binding agreement than on what 
the individual players can do and second, by the fact that co-operative behaviour 
ignores how the group of countries/players in the coalition function internally. 
Alternatively, when the possibility of coalition formation is modelled as a non-co-
operative game, one must specify how the coalitions form and how the individual 
member countries choose joint actions (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Typically, as 
will be explained below, while co-operation based coalitions derive from the aggregate 
worth of a coalition (or what the aggregate payoffs for the coalition are), those from 
non-co-operative behaviour obtain from individual payoffs. Further, in case of co-
operative climate regimes, the worth of a climate coalition is based on the actions of 
those inside the coalition wherein these actions are distinguishable from those who are 
outside it. In comparison, the value or the payoffs of the individual non-co-operation 
based climate blocs are drawn from the same guiding rules or principles. In addition, 
while co-operation based coalitions rely on the concept of a Core (defined below), the 
non-co-operative games of coalition formation function on the premise of internal and 
external stability. A more formal exposition of these aspects is presented below. 
4.3.1.  Co-operation and concept of Core    
If ଵܰ denotes a subset of countries forming a climate coalition or climate bloc and ଶܰ is 
the set of countries that lie outside the climate bloc such that ଵܰ ൅ ଶܰ ൌ ܰ, then the 
worth of the coalition ଵܰ can be defined by the characteristic function, ݓ, which is 
 
ݓሺ ଵܰሻ ൌ  ∑ ݑ௜൫݌ேభ, ݌ேమ൯௜אேభ ,       (6) 
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with the emissions vector ݌ேమ following from some assumed action taken by the 
countries outside of the climate coalition, while ଵܰ, ଶܰ and  ݌ேభare derived by solving 
the maximisation problem for the countries in the climate bloc; that is, 
max୮ొభ ∑ ݑ௜൫݌ேభ, ݌ேమ൯.௜אேభ         (7) 
The expression in (6) means that the worth of the coalition is the total payoff that is 
available for division amongst the members of the climate bloc ଵܰ.  
 
The notion of stability of a coalition in this case is embodied in the concept of the 
“core”. The idea of the core is analogous to that of the Nash equilibrium of a non-co-
operative game, that is, an outcome is stable if no feasible group-deviation is profitable 
or no sub-coalition can deviate and do better for its members. In general, for an 
݊ െplayer coalitional game with transferable utility, defined by a set of players, ܰ, and 
a characteristic function, ݓ,  the Core is defined as ܥሺܰ, ݓሻ such that 
 
ܥሺܰ, ݓሻ ൌ ൛ߨ א ܴ௡: ∑ ߨ௜௜אே ൌ ݓሺܰሻ and ∑ ߨ௜ ൒ ݓሺ ଵܰ௜אேభ ሻ׊ ଵܰ ك ܰൟ,  (8)
  
 
where ߨ ൌ ሺߨଵ, ߨଶ, … ߨ௡ሻ is an ݊ െ dimensional imputation.  An imputation is defined 
as an “efficient” and “individually rational" distribution of the payoff of the grand 
coalition, a single coalition with all the ݊ players as members.5 That is, the Core is the 
set of imputations in which no coalition has a value greater than the sum of its 
members' payoffs. Therefore, no coalition has the incentive to leave the grand coalition 
and receive a larger payoff (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Wood, 2010). 
 
In the specific circumstance of a global climate change treaty, one shall be concerned 
with the grand coalition ሺܰሻ implementing the socially desirable emissions vector. 
Accordingly, if ߨௌ ൌ ሺߨଵௌ, ߨଶௌ, … ߨ௡ௌሻ defines the imputation at the socially desirable 
emissions vector, ݌ௌ, and ݐ௜ is the transfer such that ∑ ݐ௜௜אேభ ൌ 0, and ߨ௜
כ ൌ ߨ௜ௌ ൅ ݐ௜, 
then an imputation ߨכ ൌ ሺߨଵכ, ߨଶכ, … ߨ௡כ ሻ lies in the core if ∑ ߨ௜כ ൒ ݓሺ ଵܰሻ ׊ ଵܰ ك௜אேభ ܰ 
(Finus, 2003). 
 
Accordingly, the focus of analysis in Chander and Tulkens (1997) is on the ߛ-core. 
They characterise the co-operative game where a subset ଵܰ of countries denotes the 
climate coalition, which maximises its collective benefit, while ଶܰ is the set of 
countries that lie outside the climate bloc and act non-co-operatively. Then, following 
the notion of payoff described in (6), the payoff or utility of the climate bloc will be: 
  
                                                 
5 Efficiency implies that the aggregate payoff exactly distributes the total value, or ∑ ߨ௜ ൌ ݓሺܰሻ,௜אே   and 
individual rationality entails that individually the distributed payoff is at least as high as what a player 
could obtain on its own, or, ߨ௜ ൒ ݓሺሼ݅ሽሻ ׊݅ א ܰ. 
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 ݓఊሺ ଵܰሻ ൌ  ∑ ݑ௜൫݌ேభ, ݌ேమ൯௜אேభ ,       (9) 
 
where ݌ேభand ݌ேమ are the emissions of the climate bloc and sum of emissions of 
countries outside the bloc respectively. The core of the associated game will be the set 
of possible payoff vectors for the countries in the grand coalition where no coalition 
will benefit if the grand coalition dissolves into singletons (or individual countries) 
when any coalition or individual country breaks away from it. Thus, all countries are 
singletons and maximise their individual payoffs, as in the Nash equilibrium. The 
payoff of a country ݅ depends upon its emissions as well as the transfers ݐ௜ received by 
it such that ∑ ݐ௜௜אேభ ൌ 0. Thus, 
 
ߨ௜ ൌ ܾ௜ሺ݌௜ሻ െ ݀௜൫∑ ݌௝௝אே ൯ ൅ ݐ௜.       (10) 
 
It is shown by Chander and Tulkens (1997) that the ߛ-core is non-empty if the transfers 
are chosen such that 
 
ݐ௜ ൌ ܾ௜൫݌௜ே஼൯ െ ܾ௜൫݌௜ௌ൯ െ
ௗ೔
′ ሺ∑ ௣ೕ
ೄ
ೕאಿ ሻ
∑ ௗೖ
′ ሺ∑ ௣ೕ
ೄሻೕאಿೖאಿ
. ሾ∑ ܾ௞ሺ݌௞ே஼ሻ െ ∑ ܾ௞ሺ݌௞ௌሻ௞אே௞אே ሿ. (11) 
with superscripts ܰܥ and ܵ denoting the non-co-operative and socially optimal 
outcomes respectively, the first term in the right hand side of (11) is payment to be 
received by a country as compensation for the loss of utility that it will suffer in moving 
from the Nash equilibrium to the social optimum. The second term is the payment 
made by each country in proportion to the fraction of marginal damages in it to the total 
marginal damages in all the countries covering the total decrease of benefits included in 
the square brackets (due to a move from the social optimum to the non-co-operative 
outcome). Thus, according to (11), a country that gains more from emissions reduction 
in the form of reduced marginal damages also bears a larger opportunity cost of co-
operation. 
 
The concept of a core such as the one described above is criticised in at least two 
significant respects (Finus, 2003). First, the core carries a normative notion as it focuses 
on the first-best or the most efficient outcomes. Thus, it does not explain real world 
phenomena such as formation of sub-optimal coalitions or climate blocs such as those 
that have emerged lately, namely the emerging economies of BRIC countries together 
with the US, small island states etc. at the Copenhagen Summit. Second, while the 
transfer scheme is useful in the context of a heterogeneous set of countries, the transfer 
formula provides an incentive to countries to misreport their abatement costs and 
environmental preferences. Since the payments depend on the fraction 
ௗ೔
′ ሺ∑ ௣ೕ
ೄ
ೕאಿ ሻ
∑ ௗೖ
′ ሺ∑ ௣ೕ
ೄሻೕאಿೖאಿ
, 
countries may have the incentive to bias their estimation downward, while with the 
receipts depending on the loss of benefits, captured by the difference ܾ௜൫݌௜ே஼൯ െ
ܾ௜൫݌௜ௌ൯, countries might tend to overstate this loss or utility to receive higher 
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compensation. This leads us to seek out alternative forms of coalitions based on non-
co-operative behaviour.  
4.3.2. Coalition formation as a non-co-operative game 
In comparison with the above, if one assumes the emergence of several coalitions, say 
ܯ number of coalitions, with the structure ܥ ൌ ൫ܥଵ, ܥଶ,…,ܥ௄,…,ܥெ൯, then the value 
function of country ݅ that belongs to a coalition, say ܥ௄, can be expressed as 
ݒ௜ሺܥ௄, ܥሻ ൌ ݑ௜ሺ݌ே஼஼ሻ ൅ ݐ௜,        (12) 
where ݌ே஼஼ ൌ ሺ݌ଵே஼஼, ݌ଶே஼஼, … , ݌௄ே஼஼, … . , ݌ெே஼஼ሻ is the equilibrium vector of pollutants 
emitted by each coalition ܥ௄ א ܥ (with ܰܥܥ denoting the non-co-operative coalitions 
outcome) by maximising the total payoff of countries belonging to the coalition, that is, 
݉ܽݔ௣಼ ∑ ݑ௜ሺ݌௄, ݌ି௄ሻ௜א஼಼         (13) 
and ݐ௜ is the transfer paid or received by country ݅ based on a decided transfer 
mechanism. Notably, the emissions vector ݌ି௄ follows from all coalitions outside of 
ܥ௄ maximizing maximising their individual payoffs. 
Non-co-operation based coalitions pre-suppose stability as put forward by 
d’Asperemont et.al (1983) implying both internal and external stability of the cartel. 
These concepts of stability underlie the works of Carraro and Siniscalco (1991, 1993), 
Barrett (1994, 1997), Carraro (2000) and Finus (2001), which rely on either Nash-
Cournot (simultaneous move) or Stackelberg (sequential move) behaviour by countries 
who participate in the international climate treaty versus those who do not participate.6 
Internal stability entails that no member or participant of the coalition has the incentive 
to leave the coalition to become a non-member while external stability implies that no 
non-participant finds it profitable to become a member of the coalition.  
More formally, with payoff of coalition ܥ௄כ  defined as above, where a participant ݅ א ܥ௄כ  
and a non-participant ݆ ב ܥ௄כ , and with the coalition structure given by ܥ ൌ
ሺܥ௄כ ,1,1,...1), where ܥ௄כ  denotes the coalition of countries, while other countries do not 
form a coalition but remain singletons, then stability is characterised by the following: 
Internal stability:  ݒ௜ሺܥ௄כ : ܥ௄כ , 1,1, … 1ሻ െ ݒ௜ሺ݅: ܥ௄כ െ 1, 1,1, … 1ሻ ൒ 0׊݅ א ܥ௄כ  that 
implies that there is no incentive for a member country to leave the climate coalition. 
External stability:   ݒ௝ሺ݆: ܥ௄כ , 1,1, … 1ሻ െ ݒ௝ሺܥ௄כ ൅ ݆: ܥ௄כ ൅ ݆, 1,1, … 1ሻ ൒ 0׊݆ ב ܥ௄כ , 
which means that there is no incentive for a non-member country to join the climate 
coalition. 
                                                 
6 More precisely, a simultaneous move game assumes that the choice of emissions by the participants and 
non-participants is made concurrently in time; the sequential game is premised on a sequential choice of 
emissions such that the participants are the Stackelberg leader and non-participants are Stackelberg 
followers. 
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Finus (2003) evaluates the premise of internal and external stability and claims that the 
internal stability of a coalition derives from the notion of profitability for all the 
participants as compared to the status quo and of joint welfare maximisation of the 
climate coalition. However, in the face of heterogeneity of countries and need for 
operating side payments (as transfers), there is less support for the premise of joint 
welfare maximisation through co-operation amongst countries of the world. 
Furthermore, the notion of self-enforcing international climate treaties rests on the 
premise of weak punishment in that as a member country leaves the coalition, the 
others merely hang on together and re-optimise their strategies. This is indeed 
corroborated by real world experience of the limited scope for punishment (as 
compared to the core) and is likely to reduce the effectiveness of climate change 
treaties. Finally, the notion of stability rests on the assumption of complete information. 
In reality, the problems of information asymmetry between countries, about costs of 
climate abatement or environmental preferences, persist. This makes it necessary to 
turn attention to self-enforcing mechanisms for climate change mitigation that would 
explicitly incorporate such information constraints. In this sense, mechanisms that 
address information constraints may yield pollution outcomes that are worse than those 
under full co-operation as these tend to be second- or third-best, to say the least. The 
design of self-enforcing climate change in the face of information issues constitutes the 
focus of discussion in the next section. 
5. Self-enforcing framework to implement social optimum: a mechanism 
design approach 
We reconsider the global emissions framework as introduced in Section 4. As has been 
discussed, the sharing of burden/costs of lowering GHGs to mitigate global warming is 
a typical case of public goods provision, and as conjectured by Samuelson (1954), there 
exists no resource allocation mechanism that can ensure a fully efficient level of this 
provision.  There is little incentive for individual countries to take account of the global 
pollution created by gross emissions by all countries. The key parameters that affect an 
individual country’s decision regarding emissions are the direct effect of the emission 
reduction on its cost of production (or emissions abatement) or utility/ benefits. These 
parameters address the aggregate costs incurred to reduce the negative impact of 
emissions. Analysis of these types of costs is not rare in environmental economics, 
especially in the context of public goods provision. A common example is the costs 
associated with cleaning up an oil spill. Henceforth, we focus only on the emissions 
abatement costs and call the parameter the “clean-up cost” of emissions.  
 
Clearly, the clean-up cost of a country depends on the technologies available to it, cost-
effectiveness etc. Therefore, it is understandable that information regarding the clean-
up cost of a country may not be readily available to other countries, that is, the clean-up 
cost of a country is very much its “private information” (we will also call it “type”). As 
already pointed out in Section 4, when each country pursues its own welfare 
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maximisation, the resulting outcome deviates from the socially optimum outcome. A 
natural question that arises is whether it is possible to co-ordinate the actions of all 
countries such that they not only consider their individual clean-up costs, but also 
endogenise the “public bad” nature of emissions into their decision-making. If we 
believe that there is an international regulatory authority to enforce such a social 
optimum, we must also assume that the authority has adequate information regarding 
the clean-up costs of all the countries needed to achieve emissions reduction in an 
efficient manner. This is because the authority must minimise the total cost inflicted on 
the global society by the aggregate emissions of all countries. This total cost must 
internalise the cost on the global society from emissions apart from the clean-up cost of 
individual countries. The main hurdle the regulatory authority faces is lack of 
information about clean-up costs of individual countries. The only “non-strategic” 
approach could be just to ask the countries to report their clean-up costs. But, there are 
enough reasons to believe that the countries will not report truthfully! 
 
To put it intuitively, since the clean-up costs of all the countries are unknown to the 
authority and is not directly verifiable, each country would try and strategise its 
reporting in its favour.7  In other words, if asked to report its clean-up cost, a country 
will have a wide range of possible values to report from. It is very likely that if the 
country reports an incorrect value for its clean-up cost, the country is better off! 
 
It is, therefore, not sufficient to constitute a regulatory authority (e.g. supra-national 
institution) even with consensus among all the countries. Although countries agree on 
tackling the global pollution emerging from their individual actions, enforcement 
remains difficult (to say the least!) as each country finds it beneficial to be strategic and 
report “not truthfully”. 
 
The entire scenario demands a solution concept, which can strategically enforce or 
implement the socially optimal outcome, that is, can eke out the private information 
from the countries by providing appropriate incentives for doing so and by proving to 
be adequately adverse for not doing so! This requires use of tools from game theory 
with a framework leading to an objective outcome for every possible parametric 
configuration or type-vector of countries (characterised by clean-up costs, pollution 
damages and such like). We also require this entire set-up to be such that it works with 
no external assumptions, but with a built-in process. This is a reasonable demand 
placed on the mechanism, as the existence of a supra-national authority is both difficult 
to achieve and entails a lot of “not so much economic” factors. We would rather abstain 
from this difficulty and would be happier with the framework being self-enforcing. 
Thus, ultimately we arrive in the domain of what is called a Mechanism Design 
problem! Mechanism design provides a framework for the analysis of allocation 
mechanisms (for example, a public good such as climate change mitigation) with 
                                                 
7 Each country would have the incentive to either misreport (understate) its willingness to pay or 
overstate its costs of pollution abatement, so as to reduce its own share of aggregate clean-up burden. 
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specific focus on problems associated with incentives and private information. In our 
specific context of climate change mitigation, the allocation mechanism will be 
proposed to be adopted at the international level and ensure compliance that will be 
driven by the compatibility of allocation rules with individual countries’ self-interested 
goals. 
 
In the next sub-section, we introduce the formal model. Thereafter, we demonstrate the 
divergence between the social and private optima, given the information problems 
outlined above. Lastly, we provide a simple self-enforcing mechanism that implements 
the social optimum while ensuring that countries report truthfully without overstating 
clean-up cost or understating emissions.  
5.1.  The Model 
We closely follow the set-up introduced in the last section. To formalise the above 
structure as a tractable model, we make a couple of assumptions. We assume that there 
is only one homogeneous form of pollution arising out of emissions and we assume that 
it is possible to put a value on the environmental damage from the aggregate level of 
emissions. Like earlier, let  ܰ ൌ ሺ1, 2, … . , ݊ሻ denote the set of all countries. Also, let 
ܧ ൌ ሺ ଵܲ, ଶܲ, … ., ௡ܲሻ denote the emissions vector that specifies the emissions levels by 
all the countries in ܰ. Let ܦ be the social damage or social cost function that captures 
the global cost inflicted by the emissions by all the countries. Thus, ܦሺܲሻ denotes the 
total damage value, where ܲ is the total or aggregate worldwide emissions, i.e. 
ܲ ൌ ∑ ௜ܲ௡௜ୀଵ . It is assumed that ܦ′ሺܲሻ  ൐ 0 and ܦ′′ሺܲሻ ൐ 0. These assumptions 
regarding the cost functions are standard in economics literature. We note that ܦ 
denotes the overall damage to the world. Thus, even though countries do vary in terms 
of being affected by climate change, function ܦ captures the “public bad” aspect of it, 
namely, the cost borne by the entire world.8 
 
Let ܥሺ ௜ܲ, ߆௜ሻ denote the clean-up cost incurred by the ݅th country, where ௜ܲ is the 
emissions by the ݅th country and ߆௜ is a parameter indicating clean-up technologies 
available with the ݅th country. Naturally, the cost incurred to wipe out the negative 
effects of emissions depends on (a) the amount of emissions ( ௜ܲ) and (b) the 
technologies (including advancements and innovations which are mainly dynamic in 
nature) or equipment available and favourable environment (߆௜). Clearly, ߆௜ captures 
all the information that is private in nature and unknown to all except the ݅th country. 
We also assume that ߲ܥ/߲ ௜ܲ ൏ 0 and ߲ଶܥ/߲ ௜ܲଶ ൐ 0. The first assumption depicts that 
the clean-up cost rises as the amount of pollution falls. The second assumption implies 
that the marginal clean-up cost rises as the amount of emissions by a country rises. We 
                                                 
8 That is, the cross-country differences in pollution damages are not ruled out.   
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reiterate that both the determining factors, ௜ܲ and ߆௜, are known to the ݅th country. 
More concretely, countries know their respective clean-up cost functions.9 
5.2.  Social optimum and private optimum 
Consider a laissez-faire economy with clean-up cost function ܥሺ. , ߆௜ሻ. With no 
regulation on its emissions, the country chooses an emissions level ௜ܲ that minimises its 
cost, i.e. the clean-up cost ܥሺ ௜ܲ, ߆௜ሻ. This is given by simple optimisation condition: 
డ஼
డ௉೔
ൌ 0 ൌ൐ ܥሺ పܲഥ, ߆௜ሻ ൌ  0        (10) 
Thus  Pనഥ is the optimal level of emissions that the country chooses to emit when there is 
no regulation.10 We now characterise the social optimum in this framework. To reach a 
socially optimal (or efficient) level of emissions, we need to minimise the total cost 
inflicted by all the countries put together, i.e. 
Minต
୔౟
 ሾDሺP ሺθሻሻ ൅  ∑ CሺP୧ሺθሻ,Θ୧ሻሿ   ୬୧ୀଵ subject to ∑ P୧ሺθሻ ൌ P୬୧ୀଵ , for all θ. (11) 
Clearly, the solution to (11) requires finding out an emissions vector Pనന such that it is 
obtained by solving the following expression: 
ቂபୈሺ୔ሻ
ப୔౟
ቃ ൅ பେ
ப୔౟
ൌ 0 ൌ൐  பେ
ப୔౟
ൌ  െ    பୈሺ୔ሻ
ப୔౟
      (12) 
Since in (12), D′ሺPሻ  ൐ 0 and பେ
ப୔౟
 ൏ 0 when evaluated at Pనന, it must be that PనഥሺΘሻ ൐
 PనനሺΘሻ. This shows that private optimal emissions are higher than the socially optimal 
level. This is very much in conformity to what we have argued so far and captures the 
effect of emissions as a global public bad while computing the global socially optimal 
outcome. 
While we have justified our requirement for a self-enforcing framework that elicits 
truth telling from the respective countries and establishes a socially optimal outcome, 
we have not said much about the economic frameworks that will make it achievable. 
Next, we give a brief overview of such frameworks or Mechanism Design theory. 
                                                 
9 Notably, clean up costs may be beset with uncertainty. However, the paper abstracts from issues of 
uncertainty in clean-up costs and instead focuses attention only on the issues of asymmetry of 
information of these costs across countries.   
10 This is analogous to the unbounded emissions characterised in the last section, but now by taking into 
account information asymmetry on clean-up costs. 
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5.3.  The mechanism design problem 
Implementation theory deals with group decision-making processes under various 
information structures. The objective of this theory is to structure the strategic 
interactions of the agents in a group so that their actions lead to a socially desirable 
outcome in each “state of the world”, which in our case will take the form of optimal 
GHG emissions abatement. The group’s collective objectives are specified by a social 
choice rule that selects a set of alternatives from the available set in every state of the 
world. A classic example is the one of building a public good or project by a public 
authority. The authority needs to compare its cost to its social benefit. For this, the 
authority needs to know all agents’ valuations for the project. But these valuations are 
private information of the agents and unknown to the public authority. Implementation 
theory attempts to design a game-form such that in every state, the equilibrium actions 
of the agents, according to a pre-specified equilibrium notion, lead to a socially 
desirable outcome in that state, that is, they belong to the image-set of the Social 
Choice Correspondence (SCC) in that state. Information available to the agents but 
unknown to the planner will affect the socially desirable outcome. The formulation of 
the problem, therefore, must use game-theoretic solution concepts that are appropriate 
for agents’ behaviour and consistent with the informational assumptions. The literature 
on implementation considers a wide range of equilibrium notions. In the “complete 
information models” (such as those discussed in Section 4), it is assumed that all agents 
know the state while the mechanism designer/ regulator does not. A natural notion of 
equilibrium in this context is Nash equilibrium (Maskin (1999)). Other notions that are 
consistent with this information setting and that have been studied include the iterated 
elimination of weakly un-dominated strategies (Moulin (1979)), sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium and various other Nash equilibrium refinements.11  
In a private information setting, each agent has private information about his/her type 
and a state is the set of types of all agents. The mechanism designer does not have 
information regarding the state. Further, an agent only knows its own type but is 
unaware of types of other agents. In this setting, solution concepts such as Nash 
implementation or iterated elimination of dominant strategies are inapplicable. This is 
because an agent is unable to predict the actions of the other agents regarding the 
elimination of strategies.  
A natural notion (amongst others) in this setting is dominant strategies. An agent never 
loses if it uses a dominant strategy at a particular state without thinking about strategies 
chosen by others.12 This solution concept is also quite robust with respect to the 
                                                 
11 Since every agent knows the types of the other agents as well, they would conjecture the possible 
actions taken by the other agents. Natural notions of equilibrium in this set up would arise from this 
pattern of rational behavior by all agents and thus iterated elimination of weak strategies or sub-game 
perfect equilibrium (in a more dynamic setting) are appropriate in this case. Nash equilibrium of course 
remains an important equilibrium concept, given its self-sufficient property by definition. 
12 If a mechanism implements a social choice function in dominant strategies, then the direct mechanism 
is dominant strategy incentive compatible. 
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information environment amongst the countries/players. In the current setting, we also 
aim to devise a mechanism, which can implement (in dominant strategies, that is, using 
dominant strategies at every possible state) socially optimal outcomes in the global 
emissions game. The following discussion focuses on one such mechanism. 
5.4.  A self-enforcing mechanism 
We consider a setting where countries can communicate with the regulator the optimal 
outcome in the global emissions game (existence of a regulator may be virtual here, as 
it is not essential to have a real institution that acts as a regulator or planner here) but 
cannot with one another. We consider schemes where the countries have been asked to 
report their types in terms of their emissions abatement costs, that is, ߆௜s. Suppose the 
scheme also involves a tax payment to be made by each country, based on the vector of 
announced types (߆෠ ൌ  ߆ଵ,෢ … . , ߆௡ ෢  ) and the emission level chosen by that country. The 
aim is to design the scheme in such a manner that each country finds it not beneficial 
for her to announce a wrong type! Thus, the transfer payment function for the ݅th 
country would depend on the announced type ߆ప,෢ announcements by the other countries 
߆ିప,෢  and emission level by the country ݅, i.e. ௜ܲ. 
We describe the scheme again: countries are asked to report their respective types, ߆௜s. 
They are also informed beforehand (that is, before they announce their types) that based 
on their announcement vector  ߆෠ , each country would pay a tax. We note that the tax 
payment made by a country may not be positive. The novelty of this piece of research 
would lie in cleverly designing the tax payment function such that each country is 
incentivised to tell/reveal the truth about its type.   
First, we define the social choice function as the rule that maps into optimal (or 
efficient) levels of emissions for a type vector. This implies that, given that the set of 
countries’ true types is ߆, allowable emissions are set at పܲനሺ߆ሻ, for all ݅ א ܰ. If the 
announced type vector is ߆෠ , the outcome is పܲനሺ߆෠ሻ. But this does not complete the 
description of the social choice function, as it needs to also specify the rules for the tax 
payments. We note that the trick lies in constructing the tax functions. This is because 
tax is the only channel through which the net payoffs of countries are adversely 
affected by higher emissions. The other part of the net payoff is the clean-up cost, 
which pushes the country to choose away from the socially optimal outcome.  
In particular, the cost function of an individual country ݅, whose  true type is ߆௜  but 
announces ߆ప,෢ (and other countries are announcing ߆ି௜ ) is ܥ൫ పܲ ന , ߆௜൯ ൅ ௜ܶሺ  పܲ ന , ߆ప ෢,
߆ି௜ሻ , where పܲ ന  is the efficient emission level chosen by the country ݅.  If a mechanism 
enforces “truth-telling” by the countries, then we must have: 
ܥ൫ పܲന൫߆ప ෢, ߆ି௜൯, ߆௜൯ ൅ ௜ܶሺ  పܲന൫߆ప ෢, ߆ି௜൯, ߆ప,෢  ߆ି௜) ൐ ܥሺ పܲനሺ߆ሻ, ߆௜)൅ ௜ܶ ሺ పܲനሺ߆ሻ, ߆௜, ߆ି௜ሻ  
݂݋ݎ ݈݈ܽ ݅ א ܰ 
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The left hand side of the inequality is the clean-up cost of country ݅ and the tax paid 
when the true type of the country is ߆௜ and the announced type is ߆ప෡ . Thus, this is the 
cost of the country while lying. The right hand side is the cost when the country is 
telling the truth. Naturally, telling the truth becomes the dominant strategy if the above 
inequality holds for any ௜ܲ and any possible announcement vector by the other 
countries ߆ି௜.  
This is a case where an adaptation of the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism 
(VCG) would be applicable to elicit truth telling as the dominant strategy for each 
country (Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)).   We state the main result in the next 
proposition: 
Proposition: If  పܲ ന  be an efficient emission function and, for each country ݅, there exists  
a transfer function  ௜ܶሺ ߠ ሻ ൌ  ܣ௜ሺ߆ି௜ሻ ൅   ∑ ܥ൫ ఫܲനሺߠ௜, ߆ି௜ሻ , ߆௝൯  ൅௝ ஷ௜
  ܦ ቀܲ ന ሺߠሻቁ,    then ሺ ധܲ, ௜ܶ) is  dominant strategy incentive compatible.  
Proof: The mechanism is as follows  the countries announce their types, i.e. ߠ௜s and 
the mechanism yields the levels of emission allotted to each country (given by   ധܲ௜) and 
taxes (given by ௜ܶ). We prove the proposition by the method of contradiction. Let  
ሺ ധܲ, ௜ܶ) be not dominant strategy incentive compatible. Thus, there exists ݅, ߠ, ߠప෡  such 
that  
ܥሺ ധܲ௜(ߠሻ, ߠ௜) + ܣ௜ሺ߆ି௜ሻ ൅  ∑ ܥ൫ ఫܲനሺߠ௜, ߆ି௜ሻ , ߆௝൯  ൅ ௝ ஷ௜  ܦ ቀܲ ന ሺߠሻቁ >  
ܥሺ ധܲ௜ (ߠప෡ , ߠି௜), ߠ௜) + ܣ௜ሺ߆ି௜ሻ ൅ ∑ ܥ൫ ఫܲന൫ߠప෡ , ߆ି௜൯ , ߆௝൯  ൅  ܦሺ ധܲ௝ ஷ௜ ሺθన,෢  θି୧)). 
Or, 
∑ CሺPന୧ሺθሻ, θ୧ሻ୧ א୒ ൅  D ቀP ന ሺθሻቁ  >  ∑ CሺPന୧ሺθన෡ , θି୧ሻ, θ୧ሻ୧ א୒ ൅  D ൫P ന  ሺθన෡ , θି୧ሻ൯   
But this violates the efficiency of  ധܲ ! 
Hence, we prove that the direct revelation mechanism implements the efficient social 
choice rule in dominant strategies.  This is an application of VCG mechanism. This 
mechanism has been used for many practical purposes including combinatorial 
auctions, replica placements etc. 
5.5.  The pros and cons: research ahead 
The tax function introduced in the last section induces each country to tell the truth, 
irrespective of the announcements made by other countries. Thus, it is a dominant 
strategy for the country to tell the truth regarding the type ߆௜. The underlying principle 
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is the same as the VCG mechanism, famous in Mechanism Design theory. We observe 
that the tax payments by an individual country depend on the social cost of gross 
pollution as well as on the (clean-up) costs inflicted on other countries from optimal 
emissions calculated at the announced cost-type vector. It will be interesting to simulate 
numerically the model with an arbitrary data set for a group of countries and to show 
how it works. However, we wish to address this problem in our future research.  
The only negative aspect of the VCG model is the assumption made by Clarke (1971) 
and Groves (1973) that there exist no income effects on the demand for better 
environment quality (in the context of this research). In other words, the VCG 
mechanism elicits truth telling about clean-up costs as a dominant strategy and the 
aggregate level clean-up of GHG emissions is at the socially desirable level when the 
utility function is quasi-linear. As part of our future research, one needs to seek out 
alternative adaptations of the VCG mechanism that would apply to a broader class of 
utility functions. Further, the transfers are not necessarily balanced, that is, the 
aggregate tax revenue may not add up to the aggregate costs of emissions abatement. 
This motivates a research question  characterisation of the tax functions in the model 
discussed above. It will also be interesting to find out what could be the practical 
implications of these tax payments. Most importantly, however, the framework, in 
principle, works without the physical presence of a supra national authority. Thus, a 
group of countries, with honest intention (at least in the negotiations round!) 
conforming to the mechanism designed above, must end up implementing the socially 
optimum outcome! Also, this is true for any number of countries and irrespective of the 
types of countries. The solution concept here is also quite robust, because the optimal 
strategies of all countries are dominant strategies, which are independent of a country’s 
knowledge regarding the types (e.g. technologies available) of other countries. Thus, 
we overcome the difficulties faced in other solution concepts alluded to earlier. 
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